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Quantum theory has provoked intense discussions about its interpretation
since its pioneer days. One of the few scientists who have been continu-
ously engaged in this development from both physical and philosophical
perspectives is Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker.1 The questions he posed
were and are inspiring for many, including the authors of this contribu-
tion. Weizsa¨cker developed Bohr’s view of quantum theory as a theory
of knowledge. We show that such an epistemic perspective can be consis-
tently complemented by Einstein’s ontically oriented position.
1 Introduction
1.1 Einstein and Bohr on realism
Most working scientists believe that there is an external world, which has the
status of a reality to be explored by science. The goal of science is to achieve
knowledge about how this external world is constituted and develops. Although
scientific methodology requires observations and measurements for this purpose,
the reality to be described is believed to “exist” independent of its possible
empirical accessibility. This view is succinctly formulated by Einstein:2
“Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality
as it is thought independently of its being observed.”
A realist stance of this kind does not exclude that acts of observation can have
effects on an observed entity, and that a measurement of one property of an
entity can lead to changes of another property. It simply claims that the “ex-
istence” of this entity is in some fundamental sense guaranteed, maybe even
necessary as a precondition to observe or measure its properties.
On the other hand, there is an opposing, popular stance to the effect that
quantum theory does not admit such an observation-independent realism. This
view, which has been perpetuated in many modern monographs and textbooks,
goes back to Bohr’s claim that in quantum theory a realism with respect to
measuring instruments is the only possible realism. According to Bohr:3
1Von Weizsa¨cker (1985).
2Einstein (1949a), p.81.
3Quoted in Petersen (1963).
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“It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is.
Physics concerns what we can say about nature.”
The two quotations by Einstein and Bohr indicate a basic point of disagreement
between the two in their ongoing conversations concerning the interpretation of
quantum mechanics in the 1920s and 1930s.4 Bohr focused on what we could
know about and infer from observed quantum phenomena. By contrast, Ein-
stein’s position led him to consider Bohr’s characterization of quantum theory
as incomplete.
Both Einstein and Bohr did not clearly realize that they addressed different
concepts of reality. Since they never made their basic viewpoints explicit, it is
not surprising that they talked past each other in a number of respects. Both
Bohr’s operationalistic and Einstein’s ontological concept of reality have their
proper places in the study of matter. Both are legitimate and even necessary,
but they must not be confused with each other. An observation-independent
reality must be described in a conceptual and formal framework different from
that used for observed facts and measurement.
1.2 Against classical prejudices
Quantum features such as non-commutativity, nonlocality, nonseparability and
the possibility of entanglement have been forcing us to revise our classical ideas
about the nature of matter. For a viable realistic interpretation of quantum
theory, the concept of realism must not be associated with ideas taken over
from classical physics, such as atomism, localization, separability, or similar
preconceptions. Here are three examples.
It is most often assumed that a measurement of a property of a system
results in one of the eigenvalues of this property. The underlying idea that
every property has a sharp numerical value has been adopted from classical
point mechanics without any sensible argument. Hence, an uncritical pointwise
valuation of properties should be avoided.
A significant topic in the Bohr-Einstein discussions concerned Einstein’s wor-
ries about the failure of separability in quantum theory. Yet, according to quan-
tum theory the material world is basically a whole which does not consist of
parts. The fact that modern quantum theory can successfully describe many
aspects of the behavior of matter in terms of elementary systems and its inter-
actions does not imply that matter is composed of such elementary systems.
The so-called “wave-particle dualism” from the early days of quantum me-
chanics led to the seemingly ineradicable misunderstanding that an electron
is either a particle or a wave. By contrast, the formalism of quantum theory
implies that there are infinitely many pairs of states of an electron which are
neither wave-like nor particle-like, although they are dual in the same sense as
wave-like and particle-like states.
4Compare Bohr (1949) and Einstein (1949b).
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1.3 Mathematical codification of quantum theory
The first attempts to formulate quantum mechanics in a mathematically rigor-
ous way were based on the fundamental uniqueness theorem for the irreducible
representations of the canonical commutations relations over locally compact
phase spaces.5 This codification, introduced by von Neumann,6 is restricted to
quantum systems with only finitely many degrees of freedom and without classi-
cal observables. As a consequence, von Neumann’s formalism does not comprise
a proper description of the interaction of a charged particle with its electromag-
netic field, the possibility of symmetry breakings, genuinely irreversible pro-
cesses, or the existence of molecular (or other) classical observables.
Fortunately, there is no reason to identify quantum theory with the historical
Hilbert-space or Fock-space representations. A more comprehensive description
has been developed in the language of topological *-algebras. The so-called al-
gebraic quantum theory is nothing other than a straightforward, mathematically
precise and complete codification of the heuristic ideas of quantum mechanics
of the pioneer days. It uses the same mathematical language for both classical
and quantum systems. It is appropriate for microscopic, mesoscopic and macro-
scopic systems with finitely or infinitely many degrees of freedom. It covers not
only classical point mechanics, classical statistical mechanics, and traditional
quantum mechanics as special cases, but also systems conceived as fields, such
as the electromagnetic field.
Algebraic quantum theory does not make use of any ad hoc assumptions
such as hidden variables or quantization procedures as they appear in other
approaches.7 In the Galilei-relativistic case, the rotation subgroup and the
Weyl subgroup, describing space translations and velocity boosts, are all that
is needed to generate the canonical commutation relations for position and mo-
mentum, for the orbital angular momentum, and for the spin angular momen-
tum. Rather than interpreting quantum theory in terms of concepts of classical
physics, the behavior of classical systems has to be explained in terms of quan-
tum theory.
1.4 Individual and statistical descriptions
A basic issue for interpretations of quantum theory is the difference between
individual and statistical descriptions. For instance, in Bohr’s view quantum
theory refers to an individual system or an individual experiment, whereas Ein-
stein insisted that quantum theory refers to a statistical ensemble of experiments
rather than individual systems. Is it possible to resolve this issue within alge-
braic quantum theory?
In classical mechanics, the mathematical formalism required for an individ-
ual description is different from the formalism required for a statistical descrip-
5Stone (1930), von Neumann (1931).
6Von Neumann (1932).
7We do not consider Bohmian mechanics, the consistent history proposal, the many-worlds
view, the approach by Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber and Pearle, and related approaches, since we
regard them as nonviable.
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tion. While the individual description of point mechanics is usually formulated
in terms of a (generally nonlinear) dynamics on an even-dimensional smooth
manifold as a phase space, the statistical formulation uses Koopman’s Hilbert-
space formalism with a linear dynamics.8
This example strongly suggests that the traditional Hilbert-space codifica-
tion of quantum mechanics corresponds to Koopman’s Hilbert-space formalism
of classical mechanics. Their common statistical nature is reflected by the fact
that they are both formulated in terms of the W*-algebraic probability theory.
On the other hand, the algebraic description of individual physical systems does
not use the topological structure of a W*-algebra,9 but only the structure of
C*-algebras with its algebraically defined norm topology.
2 Distinguishing Epistemic and
Ontic Perspectives
2.1 Epistemology and ontology
A crucial issue of any interpretational approach with respect to a scientific
theory is the relation between elements of the theory on the one hand and
elements of the domain of reality for which the theory is designed on the other.
This so-called relation of reference cannot be exhaustively addressed within the
scope of the scientific discipline concerned. For its proper discussion, genuinely
philosophical issues must be taken into account explicitly.
One of the most general demands on a sound philosophical discussion is the
distinction between epistemological and ontological statements. While ontology
is a branch of metaphysics, epistemology comprises all kinds of issues related to
the knowledge (or ignorance) of information gathering and using systems. The
ways in which human beings process information (perceptually, cognitively, and
otherwise), thus represent a set of central epistemological questions.
Ontology refers to the nature and behavior of systems as they are, indepen-
dent of any empirical access. The different stances of Einstein and Bohr can
thus be related to an ontological versus an epistemological emphasis. Their con-
flicting viewpoints demonstrate that particular problems in physics (as well as
other natural sciences) make it important to distinguish the two perspectives.
For a proper discussion of interpretations of quantum theory, Scheibe intro-
duced the notions of epistemic and ontic states of a system rather than address-
ing epistemological and ontological issues in the more general sense mentioned
above.10 Discussing epistemic and ontic states of a system can be an epistemo-
logical or an ontological matter. For instance, referring to epistemic and ontic
states of a system just as they are might be understood ontologically. Referring
8Koopman (1931).
9A W*-algebra M is a C*-algebra which is the dual Banach space of a Banach space M∗.
The topology relevant for the W*-algebraic probability theory is the σ(M,M∗)-topology on
M.
10Scheibe (1964), Scheibe (1973).
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to descriptions in terms of epistemic and ontic states, briefly epistemic and ontic
descriptions, might be understood epistemologically.
2.2 Epistemic and ontic descriptions
States of a system to which epistemic descriptions refer are called epistemic
states. The mathematical representation of such states encodes empirically ob-
tainable knowledge about them. If the knowledge about states and their associ-
ated properties is expressed by probabilities in the sense of relative frequencies
for a statistical ensemble of independently repeated experiments, we speak of a
statistical description and of statistical states.
Insofar as epistemic descriptions refer to a state concept encoding knowl-
edge, they depend on observation and measurement. Such kinds of empirical
access necessarily introduce a context under which a system is investigated.
Therefore, properties associated with an epistemic state are contextual. General
fundamental principles cannot be expected within epistemic descriptions.
States of a system to which ontic descriptions refer are called ontic states.
They represent the system exhaustively, i.e. an ontic state is “just the way it is”,
without any reference to epistemic knowledge or ignorance. In this sense, ontic
states are empirically inaccessible. The properties of the system are understood
as intrinsic properties. As individual states, ontic states are the referents of
individual descriptions.
The goal of an ontic description of quantum systems is not a nostalgic desire
for a classical picture of reality behind quantum phenomena, but to understand
quantum theory as a fundamental theory of the material world, based on first
principles such as symmetries. Such principles are assumed to be quite uni-
versally valid, and they are used to provide a description of the material world
which is as context-independent as possible or reasonable. We do not propose an
ontic description as an absolutely context-free, ultimately fundamental theory
of matter.
To the same degree to which ontic descriptions are context-independent,
they hide the richness and variety of empirical reality. This manifests itself
in the fact that pattern detection and recognition devices determine what is
considered as relevant or irrelevant. Patterns are detected and recognized by
rejecting information which is selected as irrelevant in particular contexts. Based
on such contexts, an epistemic state refers to the knowledge that can be obtained
about an ontic state.
2.3 Interplay of epistemic and ontic approaches
The very characterization of epistemic descriptions in terms of empirical access
implies that tools of observation and measurement must be addressed. This
requires the description of engineering instruments and the possibility of unam-
biguous communication. If these tools are taken for granted, their states have
to be conceived as ontic states. As a consequence, any epistemic description
presupposing tools of empirical access must be understood relative to an ontic
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description of these tools. In this sense, any epistemic description requires an
ontological commitment.
Accordingly, both epistemic and ontic elements are involved already at a
fairly basic level of discussion. In order to avoid confusion, corresponding con-
cepts of epistemic and ontic states need to be distinguished. If this is not taken
care of, there is a risk of confounding issues belonging to categorially different
domains of discussion. As Fetzer and Almeder emphasize,11
“an ontic answer to an epistemic question (or vice versa)
normally commits a category mistake.”
For instance, it would be a category mistake to discuss an ontic description of
an observation-independent reality in terms of measurements, and it would be a
category mistake to discuss the epistemic description of the observation of facts
in terms of theories not involving measurement as a key topic.
Drawing the distinction between epistemic and ontic descriptions does not
imply, though, that the two categories are unrelated to each other. On the con-
trary, the crucial point is about the relationship between the two frameworks
rather than the selection of one at the expense of the other. Based on an ontic
description of a physical system, epistemic descriptions can be derived by addi-
tionally specifying contexts which distinguish relevant from irrelevant patterns
of empirical reality. This distinction can be mathematically accomplished by in-
troducing a contextual topology. One ontic description can give rise to numerous
physically inequivalent epistemic descriptions.
3 Epistemic Descriptions of Quantum Systems
3.1 Every experiment requires a Boolean context
In physics, epistemic descriptions deal with experiments and measurements. It is
a basic fact of experimental physics that the registration of experimental results
is described in terms of classical engineering science. This situation requires a
Boolean domain of discourse, corresponding to Bohr’s insight:12
“However far the phenomena transcend the scope
of classical physical explanation, the account of
all evidence must be expressed in classical terms.”
From a modern point of view, “classical” is to be interpreted as “Boolean”,
not as macroscopic. Whether a system shows quantal or classical behavior is
independent of its size. There are small molecular systems with classical prop-
erties, like the chirality of most biologically important molecules. Furthermore,
measuring tools are not necessarily macroscopic. For example, molecular ge-
netic coding realizes a highly reliable classical, irreversible and nonanticipating
measuring instrument of molecular size.
11Fetzer & Almeder (1993), p.101.
12Bohr (1949), p.209.
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3.2 Von Neumann’s statistical formulation
The first mathematically rigorous codification of the ideas of the pioneers of
quantum mechanics was given by von Neumann.13 He derived the Hilbert-space
representation for the states of quantum systems from the uniqueness theorem
by Stone and von Neumann.14 This theorem says that for finitely many degrees
of freedom there is (up to unitary equivalence) only one irreducible Hilbert-
space representation of the fundamental canonical commutation relations. The
restriction of von Neumann’s codification to systems with only finitely many
degrees of freedom is a severe limitation which excludes an explicit description
of the environment (like the radiation field) or of measuring tools.
The Hilbert-space quantum theory introduced by von Neumann is a statis-
tical theory which expresses the expectation value Et(A) at time t of an observ-
able A on a Kolmogorov probability space (Λ,Σ,µt) as Et(A) =
∫
Λ
λµt(dλ).
Here A is a selfadjoint Hilbert-space operator with the spectral resolution A =∫
Λ
λE(dλ), where B 7→ E(B) is a projection-valued set function on the Boolean
σ-algebra Σ of Borel sets B in the spectrum Λ of A. The probability measure
µt is given by µt(B) = tr
{
DtE(B)
}
, where the density operator Dt (a nonneg-
ative trace-class operator with tr(Dt) = 1) describes the statistical state at the
instant t.
A statistical description refers to an ensemble of experimental results as
registered with laboratory instruments. It may be tempting to interpret such
an ensemble as a collection of individual systems. However, in quantum theory
object systems are in general entangled with their environment. Therefore,
a statistical description does not allow us to refer to properties of individual
quantum objects. This does not mean that quantum systems do not “have”
properties, but it means that the discussion of properties of individual quantum
systems does not pertain to the domain of epistemic descriptions.
In von Neumann’s approach, statistical states are represented as linear func-
tionals, generalizing the idea that the expectation value of a sum of operators
should equal the sum of the expectation values of individual operators (even if
they do not commute).15 This postulate is difficult to justify since the sum of
non-commuting operators is not operationally explained. It is not at all triv-
ial that statistical expectation values can be represented by linear functionals.
This problem has been solved by Gleason’s theorem,16 which implies that every
σ-additive probability measure on the projection lattice on a Hilbert space H
of dimension larger than two can be extended to a unique normalized positive
normal linear functional B(H)→ C on the algebra B(H) of all bounded linear
operators acting on H. In quantum theory, such a normalized positive normal
linear functional is called a statistical state functional. Gleason’s theorem is of
probabilistic nature and does not apply to individual descriptions.
In addition to the linearity of statistical state functionals, the evolution of
13Von Neumann (1932).
14Stone (1930), von Neumann (1931).
15Postulate E in von Neumann (1932), chapter IV.1, p.164.
16Gleason (1957).
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statistical states is linear as well. In contrast to widespread misconceptions, this
linearity is independent of the superposition principle. Physical statistical the-
ories are based on abstract convex structures which can be defined without any
reference to linear spaces.17 A basic postulate for any statistical description is
Mackey’s axiom IX requiring the commutativity of the operation of convex linear
combinations with the the time evolution semigroup for a statistical ensemble.18
It is essentially this postulate which implies the linearity of the dynamics of any
fundamental statistical theory.19
A well-known example is Koopman’s Hilbert-space formalism which rephrases
the nonlinear Hamiltonian equations of motion of classical mechanics in terms
of linear equations of motion for classical statistical mechanics.20 Another ex-
ample is the equivalence of nonlinear stochastic differential equations in the
sense of Itoˆ with the linear Fokker–Planck equations.
3.3 The so-called measurement problem
To include measurements in his statistical approach, von Neumann introduced
the ad hoc postulate that a measurement of an observable A with a purely
discrete nondegenerate spectrum and the spectral resolution A =
∑
k ak Pk
(Pk = P 2k = P
∗
k ) transforms any initial density operator D into the eigenstate
Dj := Pj DPj/tr(DPj) if the eigenvalue aj is measured.21 The nonlinear, non-
deterministic, discontinuous, instantaneous change D → Dj formalizes the his-
torical idea of “quantum jumps” and is usually referred to as the projection
postulate (corresponding to the reduction of the wave packet). Since the density
operator D always refers to a statistical ensemble rather than one particular
outcome, von Neumann’s discontinuous nonlinear map D → Dj describes a
change from a statistical to an individual description.
In classical probability theory such a map can be expressed in terms of
Bayes’ rule for updating probabilities. That is, tr(DjA) is the conditional ex-
pectation of A, under the condition that the event aj has occurred. Since the
projection postulate merely indicates a change from a statistical to an individ-
ual description, the interpretation of the nonlinear map D → Dj as a physical
process is untenable. In the statistical description, the so-called objectification
problem (“how can a pointer observable assume a definite value?”) is ill-posed
as well: a statistical description never leads to definite individual results, but
to well-defined probabilistic predictions.
3.4 Contemporary views on measurement
A realistic theory of measurements has to be dynamical and, therefore, cannot
be based on von Neumann’s projection postulate. Moreover, the dated view that
17Stone (1949).
18Mackey (1963), p.81.
19The basic results are due to Kadison (1965).
20Koopman (1931).
21Von Neumann (1932), sectionVI.1, pp.222–225.
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quantum measurements deal with the determination of eigenvalues of selfadjoint
operators (the so-called “observables”) has been superseded by modern response
theory. It specifies a classical output signal of a quantum system in response to
a classical external stimulus, say an electromagnetic field or a mechanical force.
For example, no spectroscopic measurement is a direct measurement of energy.
The response in a spectroscopic experiment is given in terms of a molecular
electric or magnetic multipole moment. Only by using the intricate theory of
line broadening and level shifts can approximate information about energy levels
be deduced.
A mathematical model which relates the information about an input stimulus
to the information contained in the output response is called an information
channel. Thus, information is a central concept of any epistemic description.
The output system can be characterized by a Kolmogorov probability space
(Ω,Σ,ν), consisting of a set Ω (the sample space), a class Σ of subsets of
Ω which is a σ-algebra (of experimentally decidable events), and a σ-additive
probability measure ν on Σ. The classical statistical output states are given by
probability densities, i.e. by positive normalized elements of the Banach space
L1(Ω,Σ,ν) of equivalence classes of integrable complex-valued functions on Ω.
Within the traditional Hilbert-space framework, a quantum information
channel can be described in terms of a Hilbert space H and an affine map
Λ : B(H)∗ → L1(Ω,Σ,ν) which transfers a normal state functional ρ ∈ B(H)∗
on the W*-algebra B(H) of all bounded operators on H to a probability den-
sity f ∈ L1(Ω,Σ,ν) of the classical output system, Λ(ρ) = f .22 The statistical
state functional ρ can also be represented by a density operator Dρ acting on
H, ρ(A) = tr(DρA) for every A ∈ B(H). Every affine mapping from the set
of all density operators on the Hilbert space H to the set of probability mea-
sures on the measurable space (Ω,Σ) can be realized by a normalized positive
operator-valued measure F : Σ → B(H), also called a probability-operator
measure.23 Every positive operator-valued measure F :Σ → B(H) defines by
µ (B) = tr {DρF (B)} (B ∈ Σ) a probability measure µ on the measurable space
(Ω,Σ), and by µ(B) := ρ {F (B)} and Λ(ρ) := f := dµ/dν a measurement
channel Λ(ρ).
Applying standard methods of statistical decision theory, information about
the statistical state ρ of the object system can be inferred by observing the clas-
sical output system. Since the convex set of all statistical quantum states is in
general not a simplex, a statistical description of quantum systems does not de-
termine an ensemble of individual systems. That is, a description of a quantum
system in terms of statistical, epistemic states does not allow a reconstruction of
an individual description in terms of individual, ontic states. A statistical exper-
iment yields information about the epistemic quantum state which determines
the response behavior of the chosen experimental arrangement. Any statement
about intrinsic “properties” of an individual object system is impossible in an
epistemic description.
22This fertile view was first proposed by Holevo (1972).
23For details of the definition of positive operator-valued measures compare for example
Berberian (1966).
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3.5 Full-fledged epistemic descriptions
Essentially all verifications and applications of quantum theory are based on the
engineering approach sketched in the preceding subsection. Nevertheless, this
approach is not complete. Engineering quantum theory cannot not explain the
existence of facts, and it does not specify under which experimental conditions
measurable events can occur at all. It provides just the conditional probability for
an event B ∈ Σ registered on a classical output device, under the condition that
the measuring instrument has factually and irreversibly registered this event. To
achieve a complete dynamical description of the measurement process, the tools
necessary for a registration of the results of a measurement have to be included
in the theoretical description.
Facts make particular propositions true and others false, so they are to be
described in Boolean terms. This means that in quantum theory facts must be
described by classical observables. They are defined via the center of the algebra
of the full quantum theoretical description. The center Z(M) of an algebraM is
a commutative algebra, defined as the set of all elements of M which commute
with all elements of M. The selfadjoint elements of the center Z(M) of the
algebra of observables of a quantum theoretical description are called classical
observables.24
The emergence of classical observables can only be derived from quantum
systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom, e.g. including the electromag-
netic field. This is impossible under the condition of a locally compact phase
space presupposed by the Stone-von Neumann theorem of traditional Hilbert-
space quantum mechanics. If this condition is relaxed, the framework of alge-
braic quantum theory allows us to comprise classical observables.
A full statistical description for the measurement of an observable A with
a purely discrete nondegenerate spectrum and the spectral resolution A =∑
k ak Pk is given by the linear map D →
∑
k pkDk, with pk := tr(DPk) .
This map D → ∑k pkDk is a statistical description of a measuring operation
if and only if the final density operator
∑
k pkDk represents a mixture of clas-
sically disjoint states with the weights pk. Two quantum states described by
two density operators Dr and Ds are called disjoint, if a classical observable
Z exists such that tr(ZDr) 6= tr(ZDs). Hence, disjoint states can be distin-
guished and classified operationally by the numerical value of an appropriate
classical observable. While a nonpure reduced state of a quantum system en-
tangled with its environment can be described by p1D1 + p2D2 + · · · pnDn, a
proper classical mixture is represented as a density operator by the expression
p1D1 ⊕ p2D2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ pnDn , where D1 := D1 ⊕ 0⊕ · · · ⊕ 0 , etc.
A quantum system can act as a measurement apparatus only if it can produce
disjoint final states. If the fundamental dynamics is given by a one-parameter
group of automorphisms, such a result cannot be completed in finite time. But
Hepp proved that for appropriate quantum systems a one-parameter automor-
phism group exists such that for classically equivalent initial states their asymp-
24By construction, classical observables depend on Planck’s constant ~. The still widely
held view that classical mechanics is given by the limit ~→ 0 is untenable.
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totic limits exist for t→∞ and their final states are disjoint.25
Hepp’s crucial contribution did not solve the statistical measurement prob-
lem, though, since it leaves the possibility to reverse the measurement process
at any finite time.26 Since facts cannot be undone, a measuring process has to
be governed by an irreversible dynamics. The decisive idea of combining the
nonanticipative character of laboratory instruments with a dynamics generating
asymptotically disjoint final states was worked out by Lockhart and Misra.27
In the proposed dynamics the time-inversion symmetry is broken and given by
a weakly contractive semigroup (based on a K-flow) which produces asymptot-
ically disjoint final states in a strictly irreversible manner. The emergence of
disjoint states occurs progressively over finite amounts of time.28
4 Ontic Descriptions of Quantum Systems
4.1 General structure of individual descriptions
Quantum theory is well established only in its statistical epistemic formulations.
Although Bohr defended the view that quantum theory refers to individual
systems, he never indicated a mathematical formulation of his conviction. Most
adherents of one or another version of the “Copenhagen interpretation” use
von Neumann’s statistical codification, which does not allow a description of
individual systems or experiments.
Statistical descriptions of classical systems can be given in terms of Boolean
algebras. In Hilbert-space quantum theory, the corresponding probabilistic
structure is given by the non-Boolean lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert
space. A key feature of this lattice is that it is partially Boolean. That is, it
can be represented as a family of Boolean algebras pasted together such that
their operations agree with each other wherever two or more Boolean algebras
overlap.29 In the following, we adopt a similar structure for individual non-
probabilistic descriptions. Here, classical systems are characterized by commu-
tative algebras, while quantum systems are described by non-commutative, but
partially commutative algebras.
4.2 Algebraic framework for individual descriptions
The paradigmatic example for a non-probabilistic description of individual sys-
tems is classical point mechanics, where a state of an individual system at time
t can be represented by a point γt ∈ Γ of a locally compact phase space Γ . A
25Hepp (1972).
26Bell (1975).
27Lockhart & Misra (1986). Compare also Mathematical Reviews 87k, #81006 (Novem-
ber 1987).
28It has been objected that a measurement process with asymptotically disjoint final states
implies an infinite measurement time. This is a misunderstanding: every measurement in
engineering physics is of this type. For details, compare Primas (1997), Primas (2000).
29For details, compare Kochen & Specker (1965), Kochen & Specker (1967).
11
fully equivalent algebraic description can be given in terms of commutative C*-
algebras. The Gelfand representation of commutative Banach algebras implies
that the commutative algebra C0(Γ ) of all continuous complex-valued functions
on Γ vanishing at infinity is a commutative C*-algebra C, and every commuta-
tive C*-algebra can be represented as a function algebra C0(Γ ) where Γ is some
locally compact space. In the algebraic description of classical systems with the
underlying commutative C*-algebra C, every individual state is represented by
a multiplicative linear functional υt on C.
For individual quantum systems, the role of the phase space in classical me-
chanics is taken over by a unital simple non-commutative C*-algebra A. The
partially commutative structure of a quantum system is reflected by the require-
ment that every commutative C*-subalgebra C ⊂ A represents an individual
classical system. The singly generated (by the unit element 1 and a single self-
adjoint element A ∈ A) commutative C*-subalgebras of A represent the intrinsic
properties of the system.
The ontic state of an individual system refers to its mode of being at a given
instant. The required partially commutative structure implies that an ontic
state has to be represented by a functional υ : A → C which is a linear posi-
tive functional on every commutative C*-subalgebra of A. Yet, for individual
descriptions there is no reason to assume that states are represented by positive
linear functionals on the full C*-algebra A. (Recall that in epistemic descrip-
tions the linearity of state functionals is warranted by the probabilistic Gleason
theorem.)
As a natural condition for ontic state functionals, Misra proposed monotone
positivity :30 A functional υ on a C*-algebra A is called monotone positive if
and only if A ≥ B implies υ(A) ≥ υ(B) ≥ 0 for all positive elements A,B in A.
While every positive linear functional is monotone positive, the converse is not
true. It is an open question whether nonlinear state functionals are necessary
for individual descriptions of quantum systems, or what special role linear state
functionals play.
4.3 Ontic valuations of intrinsic properties
In classical point mechanics an ontic state is determined by the values which
its associated intrinsic properties have at a given instant. This attribution of a
dispersion-free numerical value to every physical property is an ontic valuation
of the property by a real-valued point function υ : A → R. This valuation
is continuous in the sense that for a given ontic state small variations of any
property lead to small variations of its valuation.
In the early days of quantum mechanics, Dirac proposed that a dynamical
variable A has the value a if the state vector Ψ is the eigenvector of A with
the eigenvalue a.31 This partial ontic valuation of properties by point func-
tions, which is taken over from classical point mechanics, is inappropriate for
30Misra (1967).
31Dirac (1926), p.666.
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quantum mechanics. The principal objection against Dirac’s valuation is that it
is not continuous: Noncommuting elements cannot be valuated in a continuous
manner by point functions. For example, in traditional Hilbert-space quantum
mechanics, for every projection F = F ∗ = F 2 and ε > 0 there exists another
projection Fε with ‖F − Fε‖ = ε which does not commute with F . If Ψ is an
eigenvector of F with the eigenvalue 1, then F has the value 1 according to
Dirac’s proposal, while the projection Fε cannot be valued.
In 1935, Schro¨dinger proposed, in a qualitative way, a continuous ontic val-
uation of intrinsic properties in terms of a “blurring of all variables” and em-
phasized that this is a perfectly clear and consistent concept.32 Since the val-
uation proposed by Schro¨dinger has nothing to do with missing information,
uncertainty, inexactness, imprecision, indefiniteness, ambiguity, randomness, or
probability, we refer to it simply as a valuation by set functions.
An intrinsic property of an individual quantum system is represented by a
commutative C*-subalgebra C ⊂ A generated by a single selfadjoint element
C ∈ A with the spectrum sp{C} ⊂ R. Then C is isometric *-isomorphic to
the function algebra C(sp{C}). An ontic valuation of the intrinsic property C
can be characterized by the continuous set function B 7→ µCt (B), where B is an
element of the σ-algebra of Borel sets of the spectrum sp{C} of C ∼ C0(sp{C}).
Here the measure µCt is defined via the Bochner–Crame´r representation of the
characteristic function
s 7→ υt{eisC} =
∫
sp{C}
eisxµCt (dx) , s ∈ R ,
where υt is the ontic state at time t. In both classical and quantum theories,
every intrinsic property of an isolated or open system has a uniquely defined
continuous ontic valuation with respect to every ontic state. Moreover, the ontic
valuation of properties is in no way probabilistic. It refers to properties, which
the system actually and objectively has, and not to potentialities, propensities,
or dispositions. Therefore, ontic valuations should not be misinterpreted as
fluctuations or statistical spreads of supposed valuations by point functions.
If an individual quantum system is entangled with its environment, then its
ontic state cannot be extremal, and no intrinsic property has a pointwise valu-
ation, υ(C2) > υ(C)2, or equivalently,
∫
sp{C} x
2µCt (dx) >
( ∫
sp{C} xµ
C
t (dx)
)2.
4.4 Ontically dependent properties
The non-commutativity of the C*-algebra underlying an ontic, individual de-
scription of a quantum system exhibits a new kind of dependence of properties.
Loosely speaking, two properties represented by the commutative C*-algebras
C1 and C2 are called ontically independent if every possible ontic valuation of
32Schro¨dinger (1935), pp.811–812. This idea of an “objective vagueness” has not become
popular but is endorsed by some contemporary philosophers and physicists under terms like
“Verschmiertheit”, “properties lacking sharp values”, “blurred variables”, “ontic blurring”,
“objective fuzziness”, “unsharp properties”.
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C1 is compatible with every possible ontic valuation of C2. A trivial require-
ment for the ontic independence of two properties is that they are functionally
independent, i.e. that they cannot be commonly represented by a third one.
Accordingly, two properties represented by the commutative C*-algebras C1
and C2 are called ontically dependent in a nontrivial way, if they are functionally
independent, C1 ∩ C2 = 1C, and if at least two ontic valuations υ1 and υ2
exist such that there is no ontic valuation υ extending both υ1 and υ2. Two
intrinsic properties are called incompatible if they are functionally independent
but ontically dependent.
Consider two selfadjoint elements C1 and C2 of a simple non-commutative
C*-algebra A with C1C2 6= C2C1. There exist two pure linear functionals υ1 ∈
A∗ and υ2 ∈ A∗ such that υ1(C21 ) = υ1(C1)2 and υ2(C22 ) = υ2(C2)2 . As proven
by Misra, a simple C*-algebra A admits a valuation by a monotone positive
functional υ which is dispersion-free, υ(A2) = υ(A)2, for all selfadjoint elements
A ∈ A, if and only if A is commutative.33 Consequently, there is no valuation
υ with the property υ(C21 ) = υ(C1)
2 and υ(C22 ) = υ(C2)
2 if C1C2 6= C2C1.
That is, mutually non-commuting commutative C*-subalgebras of a C*-algebra
represent incompatible properties.
4.5 Superposition principle and ontic entanglement
There are many physically equivalent representations of quantum theory. The
traditional irreducible Hilbert-space representation has the important advantage
that it allows a very simple mathematical formulation of the quantum mechani-
cal superposition principle in term of state vectors: Every linear combination of
two state vectors is an other state vector, called a coherent superposition of the
two generating state vectors. Since pure states are represented by rays (and not
by vectors), the underlying state space is the set of rays, i.e. a nonlinear projec-
tive space. As a consequence, the linearity of the traditional formulation of the
quantum mechanical superposition principle is not an intrinsic feature, but a
peculiarity of a cleverly chosen representation. From a conceptual point of view,
a representation-independent formulation without linear structure is preferable:
Any two different pure states generate an uncountably infinite family of mutually
different pure states different from the two generating pure states.34
The meaning of a superposition state is not that a system “can be in two or
more states at the same time”, but that there is an ontic holistic entanglement,
implying that the system considered is not composed of independently existing
parts. Consider for example two subsystems described by mutually commuting
C*-subalgebras B ⊂ A and C ⊂ A of an individual quantum system described
by the C*-algebra A. Consider any linear state functional υ on A, two arbitrary
elements Bj ∈ B with 0 ≤ Bj ≤ 1, and two arbitrary elements Ck ∈ C with
0 ≤ Ck ≤ 1, BjCk = CkBj , with j, k = 1, 2. A quantity describing the mutual
ontic dependence of the two commuting subsystems is given by the functional
33Misra (1967).
34For a representation-independent mathematical formulation of quantum mechanical su-
perpositions, see Roberts & Roepstorff (1969).
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κ := 12 υ(B1C1 +B1C2 +B2C2 −B2C1) . Then Schwarz’s inequality implies35
|κ|2 ≤ 1 + 14 υ
{
(B1B2 −B2B1)(C1C2 − C1C2)
} ≤ 2 .
If B or C is commutative, we get |κ| ≤ 1 , a generalized Bell inequality. It
is well known that in quantum theory Bell’s inequality can be violated. If
the generalized Bell inequality is violated, |κ| > 1, the state functional υ is
holistically entangled with respect to the decomposition (B,C). The relation
|κ|2 ≤ 1 + 14 υ{(B1B2 −B2B1)(C1C2 −C1C2)} shows that ontic holistic entan-
glement between two subsystems is possible if and only if there exist incompatible
properties in both subsystems.
4.6 Dynamics of individual quantum systems
The usual time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation is linear since it refers to a
statistical description. This fact, however, does not imply the linearity of the
state dynamics in individual descriptions. Since the quantum mechanical su-
perposition principle is independent of any dynamical principle, a nonlinear
dynamics for individual quantum states is not in contradiction with the quan-
tum mechanical superposition principle. In particular, the quantum mechanical
superposition principle does not require the invariance of superpositions under
the time evolution.
According to current knowledge, the only way to derive a dynamics from
fundamental first principles is to introduce, first, group-theoretical elementary
systems and, then, interactions by gauge fields. Such a procedure is not satis-
factory because elementary systems also represent the sources of the fields by
which they interact.
Nevertheless, bare elementary systems are defined as ergodic representations
of the presupposed kinematical group. Both the Lorentz and the Galilei group
are linear Lie groups, implying that the dynamics of the corresponding bare
elementary systems is governed by linear equations of motion. Yet, bare el-
ementary systems are just auxiliary constructions. They are transformed to
dressed systems by interactions with gauge fields (e.g. electromagnetism, gravi-
tation). Dressing is a rather complicated procedure which may lead to nonlinear
equations of motion, in particular due to self-interactions. Moreover, the inclu-
sion of gauge fields enforces a discussion of quantum systems with infinitely
many degrees of freedom which may have a classical part. An interaction of
a quantum systems with a classical subsystem entails feedback effects which
necessarily generate nonlinearities in the dynamics.
Every quantum system with charged elementary systems (like electrons) in-
evitably interacts with the electromagnetic radiation field. The separation of an
individual object system from its electromagnetic environment leads to an in-
dividual non-autonomous subdynamics for the object subsystem with a driving
force which is chaotic in the individual sense of Wiener.36 Since the electromag-
35Landau (1987a), Landau (1987b).
36Wiener (1930).
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netic environment acts as a K-system,37 Birkhoff’s individual ergodic theorem
applies,38 so that the external force acting on the object system can be regarded
as an individual trajectory of a stochastic process. In this case, Birkhoff’s indi-
vidual ergodic theorem provides the crucial link between individual and statis-
tical descriptions. It allows transformation of the individual nonlinear chaotic
dynamics into the linear dynamics of the statistical ensemble description.
On this basis an individual description of the measuring process is feasible.
In simple models the reduced dynamics is then governed by a non-autonomous
nonlinear equation which transforms pure ontic states into pure ontic states.
Since the reduced object system is driven by a chaotic process (in the sense of
Wiener), its behavior exhibits a sensitive dependence on the initial conditions of
the environment. Epistemically indistinguishable but ontically different initial
states of the environment can lead to asymptotically disjoint ontic final states.
In the associated statistical description, results corresponding to the mentioned
model by Lockhart and Misra can be achieved.
5 Relations between Epistemic and Ontic
Descriptions
5.1 From first principles to observed phenomena
No fundamental theory directly describes context-dependent phenomena of em-
pirical science. To describe empirically accessible information in terms of a
fundamental theory, the contexts introduced by measuring tools or pattern de-
tection and recognition devices used by the experimentalist have to be taken
into account explicitly. In mathematical terms, a context can be imposed on
the fundamental theory by restricting its domain of validity and introducing a
new, coarser topology compatible with the intrinsic topology of the underlying
fundamental theory.
To get a mathematically complete and consistent theory, one has to close
the derived theory in the new contextual topology. This results in a qualitatively
different higher-level theory whose domain of validity may intersect nontrivially
with the domain of validity of the fundamental theory. If neither one of the two
domains is contained in the other, then any strong reductionist scheme fails.
This situation usually leads to the emergence of qualitatively new properties.
There are many possibilities to introduce a contextual topology. A standard
strategy uses singular asymptotic expansions which do not converge in the orig-
inal topology of the ontic description. Examples include the emergence of phe-
nomena of geometrical optics (such as “shadows”) in the high-frequency limit,
and the emergence of inductors, capacitors and resistors in the low-frequency
limit of Maxwell’s electrodynamics. Another instance is the emergence of the
shape of molecules in the singular asymptotic Born-Oppenheimer expansion at
37Thomas (1974).
38Birkhoff (1931).
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the singular point of an infinite nuclear mass.39 These and related examples
show that for epistemic descriptions the specification of a context is as impor-
tant as the underlying ontic description.
Another major issue in this context is the emergence of separate subsystems
(parts) from an original entangled system as a whole. (Mereological emergence
in this sense is different from mereological emergence in many philosophical dis-
cussions where a whole is considered to emerge from parts.) Any interaction
with the system as a whole, e.g. by measurement, provides disentangled sub-
systems. The states of the subsystems can have properties which the entangled
state before measurement did not have. If epistemic correlations between such
properties violate Bell’s inequality, they indicate the ontic entanglement of the
original state.
A most powerful first principle in modern physics is symmetry. In the words
of Weyl: “As far as I see, all a priori statements in physics have their origin
in symmetry.”40 Yet, fundamental symmetries are not directly accessible by
experiments. They can only be indirectly inferred by symmetry breakings.
A symmetry is spontaneously broken if the realized states show less sym-
metry than their associated equations of motion (or the Hamiltonian). Broken
symmetries play a crucial role for the description of many physical phenom-
ena. For example, ferromagnetism involves the spontaneous breakdown of the
rotation symmetry, crystallization requires the spontaneous breakdown of the
translation and rotation symmetry, superfluidity is related to the breakdown
of the special Galilei symmetry, and superconductivity is connected with the
spontaneously broken gauge symmetry.
At the molecular level, the parity symmetry is broken in the ground states
of chiral molecules (such as L-amino acids or D-sugars). Moreover, every ex-
periment presupposes irreversibility and requires nonanticipative measuring in-
struments, hence a distinction between past and future and the selection of a
direction of time. Since fundamental physical laws do not distinguish between
past and future, the time-inversion symmetry of the underlying fundamental
ontic description has to be broken.
5.2 Emergence in algebraic quantum theory
In algebraic quantum theory, a particular context can be introduced by impos-
ing a contextually selected topology upon the state space of the C*-algebra A of
the underlying ontic description. This new topology has to be compatible with
the algebraically determined, hence context-independent norm topology of A.
It can be implemented by a particular reference state, given by a positive lin-
ear state functional ρ on the context-independent C*-algebra A. The so-called
GNS-construction (according to Gel’fand, Naimark and Segal) then allows the
construction of a context-dependent Hilbert space Hρ and an associated faithful
representation piρ(A) of the C*-algebra A acting on H.41 The closure of piρ(A) in
39See Primas (1998) for more details.
40Weyl (1952), p.126.
41Compare for example Takesaki (1979), or Bratteli & Robinson (1987).
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the weak topology of the algebra B(Hρ) of all bounded operators acting on Hρ
is a context-dependent W*-algebra Mρ, called the algebra of contextual observ-
ables with respect to the contextual topology generated by the reference state
functional ρ. The relation A ∼ piρ(A) ⊂Mρ ⊂ B(Hρ) implies that all intrinsic
properties appear also as contextual properties, but in addition there are new
contextual properties which are not intrinsic.
Observables in the W*-algebraMρ of contextual observables, which are out-
side the representation of the C*-algebra piρ(A), are called emergent observables.
They represent properties which are novel in the sense that they are absent
in the more fundamental context-independent C*-algebraic description. The
emergence of novelty in contextual descriptions is a compelling fact in algebraic
quantum theory. Simple examples of emergent classical observables are the tem-
perature42 and chemical potential43 which arise in a most natural manner from
a GNS-construction with respect to canonical KMS-states.
A basic common feature in all these cases of emergent behavior is the tran-
sition from an ontic to an epistemic description. If the interaction of an object
system with its environment is not excluded, there are in general infinitely
many physically inequivalent representations of the object system. Choosing
one of these representations means to select a particular context for the epis-
temic description. The simplicity of natural laws manifests itself only in the
ontic description, while a representation of the richness of observable phenom-
ena requires the multitude of inequivalent representations.
5.3 Relative onticity
Although a picture comprising both epistemic and ontic descriptions together
with their relationship is very appealing, it is still too simplistic if epistemic and
ontic elements must be considered in one and the same descriptive framework.
For instance, such a situation is unavoidable if, as in Bohr’s perspective, an
epistemic description of a system is assumed to presuppose an ontic description
of measuring tools. In such situations, a combination of ontic and epistemic
elements is required in the desired descriptive framework. This difficulty can be
resolved if it is realized that the distinction of epistemic and ontic descriptions
can be applied to the entire hierarchy of (perhaps partially overlapping) domains
leading from fundamental particles in basic physics to chemistry and even to
living systems in biology and psychology. Ontic and epistemic descriptions are
then considered as relative to two (successive) domains in the hierarchy.
Let us briefly illustrate this by an example. From the fundamental view-
point of quantum theory, atoms and molecules are objects with highly contex-
tual properties, which can be described by interactions of electrons, nuclei, and
their environments. However, from the viewpoint of a chemist one is usually not
interested in these interactions, but in the shape, chirality, and similar features
of molecules. In such a framework, it is reasonable to consider the properties
42Takesaki (1970).
43Mu¨ller-Herold (1980).
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of an atom or a molecule as intrinsic properties in an ontic description rather
than as epistemic, contextual properties derived from more basic intrinsic prop-
erties of protons, neutrons, or even “more basic” constituents. While atoms and
molecules are epistemically described within the domain of basic physics, they
acquire ontic significance within the domain of chemistry.
Similarly, liquid water has properties which water molecules do not have,
e.g. the property of wetness. It can be derived as an emergent, contextual
property from an underlying ontic description. For a chemist, however, it would
be absurd to dismiss the wetness of water as something which does not refer
to an “independent reality” of water. Why should water only be wet if it is
observed?
The central point of the concept of relative onticity is that states and proper-
ties of a system, which belong to an epistemic description in a particular domain,
can be considered as ontic from the perspective of another domain. This idea
resembles the (less formal) discussion of “ontological relativity” originally in-
troduced by Quine.44 Quine argues that if there is one ontology that fulfills a
given theory, then there is more than one. He, thus, claims that it makes no
sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret
or reinterpret that theory in another theory.
For Quine, any question as to the “quiddity” (the “whatness”) of a thing
is meaningless unless a conceptual scheme is specified relative to which it is
discussed. He encourages “ontological commitment” in the sense that a most
proper conceptual frame should be preferred for the interpretation of a theory.
For Quine, the inscrutability of reference is the issue which causes the problems
necessitating ontological relativity, not the unique assignment of referents as
objects in the external world.45
Putnam has developed a related kind of ontological relativity, first called
“internal realism”, later sometimes modified to “pragmatic realism”.46 Onto-
logical (sometimes conceptual) relativity in Putnam’s internal realism differs
from Quine’s usage of the term in an important detail. While Quine’s onto-
logical relativity is due to the impossibility of a uniquely fixed relationship of
our concepts to the totality of objects to which those concepts refer, Putnam’s
position is more radical insofar as he questions that we know what we mean
when we speak of a totality of objects.47 This shift in emphasis is particularly
interesting in view of the holistic features of quantum systems which challenge
the notion of an object as part of a system within an ontic description.
From this rough characterization,48 a close relation between ontological rel-
ativity a` la Putnam and the idea of relative onticity is apparent. Assuming
that Putnam’s notion of an object can be more precisely characterized by the
states and properties of such an object, conceptual frames or schemes serve a
purpose very similar to contextual representations in the framework of algebraic
44Quine (1969).
45Compare Gibson (1995).
46Putnam (1981), Putnam (1987).
47Burri (1994), p. 185
48For more details see Atmanspacher & Kronz (1999).
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quantum theory. Both ontological relativity and relative onticity refer to a con-
ception of realism where the states and properties of objects have to be described
relative to a context, and they agree with regard to a basic assertion according
to which there is a “real world as such”. These basic issues can be successfully
implemented in a sound formal manner, if epistemic and ontic descriptions are
properly distinguished and related to each other.
6 Conclusions
Distinguishing epistemic and ontic descriptions of quantum systems is a key to
avoid the category mistake of confounding concepts of observation-dependent
and observation-independent quantum realities. Epistemic descriptions refer to
a statistical description of ensembles of experimental outcomes. By contrast,
ontic descriptions refer to individual systems without any respect to their ob-
servation or measurement. Epistemic and ontic descriptions require different
mathematical codifications.
Although all applications of quantum theory are based on epistemic formula-
tions, this does not imply that ontic descriptions are altogether pointless. Since
they are free from particular contexts required for particular applications, on-
tic descriptions necessarily feature a higher degree of symmetry than epistemic
descriptions. It is possible to derive epistemic descriptions from ontic descrip-
tions, if the particular contexts can be implemented precisely enough. An ontic
description of a system can give rise to many different epistemic descriptions
mutually excluding each other.
An ultimately context-free ontic description or, equivalently, a universal con-
text would be of perfect symmetry and cannot be formulated. Hence, any ontic
description presupposes an “ontological commitment”, an agreement about a
fundamental domain of discourse based on some context which is as general as
possible or reasonable. This entails a relativity of onticity which is crucial for the
coherent discussion of emergent behavior and can be formalized by contextual
symmetry breakings.
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